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In the Sttprenie Co11rt of the 
State of Utah 
SHERMAN JONES, MERLE JONES, ~~ 
BRYANT JONES and LARAINE JONES, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. \ 
) 
ALVIE L. THORVALDSON, E. NOREEN 
THORVALDSON, MERRILL OLDRO·YD 
and 0. THAYNE ACORD, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTs· BRIEF 
CASE 
NO. 10043 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action commenced by Plaintiffs, lessees, for 
declaratory interpretation of a document upon which part 
of a lease agreement was founded and a counterclaim by 
the lessors for termination of the said lease agreement for 
failure of consideration and for breach of contract. The 
defendants, in the alternative, cross-claimed against defend-
ants Oldroyd and Acord for damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. The Trial Court de-
clared the disputed document a revokable license and dis-
missed the Defendants' cross-claims against Oldroyd and 
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Acord. The Court determined that the Plaintiffs had by 
their conduct forfeited the lease. From this judgment the 
Plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmance of the judgment of the 
Trial Court and additional award of attorneys fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent feels it is essential to restate the facts 
in their brief in order that the Court may have a more 
complete picture of the sequences and background to this 
particular litigation. Prior to December 11, 1957, the De-
fendants, Thorvaldson, owned and operated a gravel and 
sand deposit in the southern end of Utah County between 
the city of Spring Lake and Santaquin. The sand and 
gravel deposits were located on the side of the mountain 
southeast of U S. Highway 91, and the property itself 
fronted on U. S. Highway 91. It was an irregular piece, 
containing approximately 40 acres of land. In addition to 
this property, the Thorvaldsons occupied and operated a 
gravel pit owned by Merrill Oldroyd, under an oral agree-
ment to do so. This gravel pit is known as the Oldroyd 
or Acord gravel pit in the present litigation and transcript. 
Prior to December 11, 1957, the plaintiffs and defend-
ants, Thorvaldson, negotiated for the sale of the defend-
ants' ready-mix concrete business and the leasing of the 
property from which the sand and gravel was extracted. 
The plaintiffs were represented by Elden Elliason, their at-
torney, and the defendants, Thorvaldson, were represen-
ted by Allen L. Hodgson. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
In order to make the lease from Thorvaldsons to Jones, 
it was necessary for a written document to be obtained, 
spt"Cifying the right that Thorvaldson had of the Oldroyd 
property. For this reason, Mr. Hodgson drew an agree-
ment dated December 9, 1957 entitled "Consent and Agree-
ment", and which was attached as Exhibit B to the plain-
tiff's petition for declaratory judgment herein. This agree-
ment, together with the property owned by Thorvaldsons 
was leased to the Jones under a document entitled "Con-
tract Assignment and Lease Agreement". Mr. Elliasoo. 
drew the said agreement and at a later date, in his office, 
Mr. Hodgson approved its form for the defendants, Thor-
valdson. This portion of the trial has not been transcribed, 
but in the opinion of the Respondent, it is essential for an 
understanding of the issues herein. 
During the year 1958 and prior to December 8, 1858, 
the Jones and Thorvaldsons had many disagreements con-
cerning the operation of the property and their obligations 
under the agreement. They finally resorted 1n litigation 
and on December 8, 1958, a complaint was filed by Alvie 
L. Thorvaldson and E. Noreen Thorvaldson against the 
Jones. At this time, Mr. Hodgson represented the Thor-
vald.sons and suit was brought to evict the defendants for 
breach of contract. This case was filed as Civil No. 21419 
in the District Court of Utah County, State of Utah. This 
was a complicated proceeding and numerous amendments 
were made and numerous counter-claims were filed; how-
ever, eventually a counter-claim was filed, wherein the 
lease was requested to be reformed in order to properly 
describe the property which the defendants in that action 
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clrumed they had leased by adding to the description an 
additional thirty acres. 
In that particular case, the plaintiffs raised the ques-
tion of illusory consideration or failure of consideration 
claiming that under the lease agreement, the Jones had 
no requirements to take any certain quantity or any quan-
tity at all of sand and gravel from the properties leased. 
At that time, they, the Jones, were hauling sand and gravel 
on to the property leased and manufacturing the concrete 
and selling sand and gravel to others and not paying Thor-
valdson any compensation for such conduct. A perusal 
of the lease will show that the only compensation to be 
paid Thorvaldson is 25c a yard for sand, gravel and top-
soil mined, and 1c a yard for fill dirt removed from the 
premises. The court reformed the contract, adding the 
additional property requested by defendants, but requiring 
the defendants, Jones, to pay 25c a yard for all materials 
"processed on" the, property. It was the interpretation 
and oontemplation of the court that the Jones would con-
tinue their operation on the property and that if the words 
"processed on" were interpreted as being in the agreement 
or was impliedly part of the agreement, that the lease 
would then not be defective (R. 115). In fact, in that 
case, counsel for the defendants, Mr. Young wrote a brief, 
wherein he agreed with the court as follows: 
"We agree that if the lease merely permitted the les-
sees to hold the premises and sell no sand, gravel and 
topsoil, it would be invalid." (R. 112) 
On that basis, the court, in its findings of fact and de-
cree, stated: 
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"Defendants are ordered to pay a royalty of 25c per 
cubic yard for all topsoil, sand and gravel processed 
on or produced from the premises leased by the plain-
tiffs to defendants and disposed upon the market." 
'J1he word "on" was added so that the lease read "pro-
ces..~ on or produced from." This made the lease valid 
and meaningful provided the Jooeses intended to obtain 
thPir material from the Thorvaldson property. 
Subsequent to the decree orf the court, the Jones people 
moved their operation to property adjacent to that leased. 
They purchased five acres of land, sufficient for the op-
eration of the concrete batch plant, and commenced opera-
tion, doing the same thing that they had done before on 
the operation of the Thorvaldson prope1rty, but since the 
plant was now operated on their own property immediately 
adjacent to Thorvaldson prope1rty, they paid nothing and 
have paid nothing to the Thorvaldsons for sand and gravel 
11processed" on their OiWil property which did not come 
from the 'I'horvaldson pits. Mr. Jones, in his testimony, 
stated as follows: 
Q. Mr. Jones, I want to read to you from your dep-
osition - first of all, I'll ask you if you didn't testify un-
der oath on the 29th day of October, 1962, did you? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now, I will call your attention to page 21, line 
28, and read these questions and answers from the depo-
sition as follows: 
"At the time of the last court hearing, were you 
manufacturing concrete on his property? 
A. No, I don't believe- yes, we were manufac-
turing it on his property. 
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Q. Since then you have moved your batch plant 
to your own property? 
A. Yes, that is right. 
Q. Now, you manufacture only on your prop-
erty, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Y oo. don't pay any royalty on that material 
you process and manufacture on your own property? 
A. Only that that we remorve from his prop-
erty. 
Q. Only that which you obtain from the prop-
erty which you leased from Mr. Thorvaldson? 
A. Right. 
Q. Do you have any requirement to take any 
material from Mr. Thorvaldson's property? 
A. You mean a determined amount? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, there is no determined amount. 
Q. You can take what you need? 
A. That is right." 
Now, this was your testimony, wasn't it? 
A. That's right. 
(R. 316, Line 5 toR. 317, Line 8) 
In the spring of 1962, Mr. Oldroyd sold a great quan-
tity of his property to Mr. Thayne Acord, and included 
within the sale was the property that had been used by 
Thorvaldson and the Jones under the agreement called 
14Contract Assignment and Lease Agreement". The Jones' 
arranged with Mr. Acord to pay Acord for the gravel re-
moved from this property, the sum of lOc a yard as dis-
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t inguished from the 25c they had been paying Thorvald-
son for the same material. Thorvaldsons told Jones, Acord 
and Oldroyd that they would not recognize such contract 
and required that Jones pay them for the material mined 
from the Oldroyd property. Furthermore, there had been 
a series of breaches of contracts by the Jones people and 
on the 24th day of August, 1962, the defendants in this case, 
Thorvaldson. served upon the plaintiffs, Jones, in this 
case, a notice to quit (R. 27), specifying eight breaches 
of contract and requiring that said breaches be remedied 
and the said defaults be paid within five days from the 
date of service or an action would be brought for treble 
damages and for possession of the property. No perfor-
mance was received to this notice ~t that on August 
29, 1962, the Jones filed with the Fourth District Court 
a petition for declaratory judgment requesting that the 
Court interpret the document entitled "Consent and Agree-
ment", which had been prepared by Mr. Hodgson. Mr. 
Hodgson, at this time, represented the plaintiffs, Jones. 
Thorvaldson filed an answer, counter-claim and cross-
claim against Merrill Oldroyd and Thayne Acord so that 
the respective rights of the parties could be litigated in 
one proceeding. 
In the counter-claim, the defendants alleged action in 
unlawful detainer, that the Contract Assignment and Lease 
Agreement was void because it was inocmplete, indefinite 
and too uncertain for enforcement, that there was mutual 
mistake on the part of the parties as to twelve conditions 
that must have been considered by the parties, that there 
was a complete lack of consideration because of lack of 
mutuality of obligation, that in the alternative, the con-
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tract ~should be reformed to conform with the true intent 
of the parties. Then the cross-complaint was filed against 
Oldroyd for damages. Denials were filed and upon these 
issues, the matter went to trial. 
The court concluded that the agreement between Thor-
valdson ·and Oldroyd was a revokable licence and that Old-
royd had elected to revoke the same, thereby reducing the 
property in which Thorvaldson had a right of royalty. This 
decision eliminated Oldroyd and Acord from the litiga-
tion. 
The litigation then went forward on the defendants' 
counter-claim and the plaintiffs' answer. The ~court, in 
its memorandum decision (R. 65) and in the findings of 
fact (R. 67) formd that the plaintiffs had violated their 
lease with Thorvaldsoo in the following particulars: 
A. Failed to remove ovevburden on the sand and 
gravel pit on the leased premises. 
B. Failed to make sales slips for materials sold rea-
sonably soon after sale and delivery of materials to 
customers. 
C. Removal and stockpiling of sand and gravel from 
the leased premises off the premises without account-
ing therefor. 
D. Abandonment of the business of selling sand and 
gravel on the leased premises. 
E. Removal of the business formally conducted from 
the leased premises. 
E. Failure to acco·unt foc sand and gravel removed 
from the premises and for which payment has not 
been made. 
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On the basis above stated, the court found that the 
plaintiffs had forfeited the lease and that defendants had 
elected and have heretofore declared the forfeiture as p~ 
vided for in the lease. The court also found that the de-
fendants were entitled to one thousand dollars for attor-
ney's fees and the defendants, Thorvaldson, were directed 
to prepare the findings of fact. 
During the course of the trial, the Plaintiffs, Jones, 
associated with Mr. Hodgson, Dave McMullin as <&attor-
ney. Af1Pr the findings of fact, judgment and decree were 
Pntered, Mr. Hodgson withdrew, and Mr. Dallas H. Young 
was associated as counsel for the plaintiffs. Mr. Young 
and Mr. McMullin had appeared as counsel for Jones when 
they were defendants in the prior oase. The case of Thor-
valdson vs. Jones, Civil No. 21419, was called to the court's 
attention and the court took judicial lmowledge of that 
case. That case has been forwarded to the Supreme Court 
as part of the transcript herein. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THE CONSIDERATION FOR THE AGREEMENT EN-
TITLED CONTRACT ASSIGNMENT AND LEASE 
AGREEMENT WAS ILLUSORY UNDER THE CIR-
CUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
As we have stated in the statement of facts, it was 
contemplated by all of the parties at the time of the pre-
vious litigation that Jones would pay Thorvaldson a roy-
alty of so much per ton for materials "produced and/or 
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process€d" on the property. The language was not a part 
of the agreement, however, counsel for the plaintiffs in the 
previous litigation had insisted that this was the intent 
of the parties and the court had interpreted the contract 
on the previous litigation to read "processed on" rather 
than "processed from" in <mier to satisfy the requirement 
of mutuality of obligation. It was the position of the 
Jones in that case that there could be no lack of consid-
eration if the contract were interpreted to require them 
to pay for material brought on the property and processed. 
thereon. Without that language in the contract, the court 
would have forfeited the lease on the previous occasion 
for failure of consideration (R. 112). Both Mr. Young 
in the previous case and in his brief therein (R. 112) and 
Mr. Hodgson in the present case and in his brief therein 
( (R. 112) stated respectively as follows: 
"Mr. Young: 'May we call attention to the fact that 
is not a contract which gives the lessees the right to 
hold the premises and to sell no sand, gravel and top.. 
soil. We concede that such a lease would be invalid" 
"Mr. Hodgson: 'We agree that if the lease merely per-
mitted the lessees to hold the premises and to sell no 
sand, gravel and topsoil, it would be invalid." 
"Mr. Young: "It is true, as a general rule, that if it 
is wholly optional with one party to a bilateral agree-
ment, whether he shall perform or not, there is no 
legal contract. The promise of that party in such a 
barg·ain is illusory, that is though in form a promise, 
it is so qualified that the promissor really engages 
himself for nothing and his illusory promise is insuf-
ficient consideration to support a counter promise. A 
promise to buy such quantity of goods as the buyer 
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may thereafter order or to take goods in such quan-
tities 'as may be desired', or as the buyer 'may want', 
is not sufficient consideration since the buyer may re-
frain from buying at his option and without incurring 
legal detriment himself or benefiting the other party. 
• • • Even a promise to buy or sell only as much 
as the promissor chooses is a sufficient consideration 
for a counter promise when coupled with the agree-
ment that whatever the buyer or seller choose to buy 
or sell, he will buy or sell to the promisee. 
To put the matter another way-the promise of a sel-
ler not to manufacture except for the buyer or the 
promise of a buyer not to buy except from a partic-
ular seller is clearly a promise to do something det-
rimental." (Emphasis added) 
In Mr. Young's brief, the Jones were arguing that 
their duty and obligation was to buy exclusively from the 
Thorvaldsons in order to overcome the argument that Thor-
valdson made at that time that the promise was illusory. 
The court concluded that that was the ~act ·and construed 
the contract to mean "processed on" as well as produced. 
The appellant now contends that they do not have to pur-
chase from Thorvaldsons except quantities "as may bed~ 
sired or as they "may want". This is the very antithesis 
of their prior position and was well known by the court in 
ad<iresmng Mr. Hodgson concerning the matter as quoted 
above. (R. 112, 113) 
Both attorneys for the defendants, Jones, admit that 
the lease would be invalid, and yet, the very facts that they 
state would cause it to be invalid are present in this case. 
Testimony of Mr. Jones himself has been quoted in ·the 
statement of facts and he has stated categorically and un-
equivocably that they do not have any requin:mlent to 
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take any material from the Thorvaldson property. That 
they can take what they want, o:r not take any, and yet 
are able to hold the property for forty years (R. 111, R. 
317). 
The chief complaint of the appellants herein is that 
they claim the court required the appellants to maintain 
a batch plant on the property, otherwise there was a for-
feiture (Appellant's Brief P. 13). This was not the find-
ing of the court nor the position argued by the Respond-
ent. The court merely stated that they had to operate 
their business on the property whether that was the sale 
of sand and gravel or the operation of a batch plant or 
whatever it was, for it was the contemplation of the par-
ties that the materials for the operation of the business 
of the Jones would be obtained from the property of Thor-
valdson, otherwise Thorvaldson would get nothing for hav-
ing leased his property to the Jones for forty years. There 
is no attempt to put specific language into the contract, 
but merely to interpret the contract according to its ex-
plicit intent. 
The removal of the plant from the property of the 
Thorvaldsons was done deliberately to circumvent the 
judgment in the first case and to avoid the payment of 
royalties on materials manufactured from other sources, 
which constitute the great bulk of the business of the 
Joneses (R. 291). The Joneses are taking sand which also 
contains a sizeable quantity of gravel, by their own tes-
timony (R. 291) and stockpiling it. When they are making 
ooncrete, and if they take material from the pile that they 
have stockpiled from the Thorvaldson pit, they pay Thor-
valdson a royalty calculated on the basis of three-tenths of 
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the eon<.TPtt> sold, it being their theory that three-tenths 
is made up of sand, which is principally the material they 
get from Thorvaldson's pit, even though they admit that 
there is gravel in it. The balance, or seven-tenths, they 
<!ssume is made up of gravel, the quantity orf ce~ment added 
being absorbed as shrinkage (R. 163). Under the meth-
octs used by the defendants, it is impossible to tell the 
quantities of sand and gravel utilized by the appellants that 
is owned by the Thorvaldsons. They merely estimate om 
the basis that sand of that approximate amount must be 
used with each cement batch; however, they cannot ac-
count for the amount of the gravel that is contained in 
the Thorvaldson material or the sand that is contained in 
the matrial received from other sources. 
The appellant has cited numerous authorities with 
which we do not take serious exception except to say that 
they are not applicable to the particular issue ;before this 
court. For example, the appellant has cited 51 CJS 683 
concerning the necessity for a foreclosure clause, but this 
provision only applies in respect to a situation ·where there 
is no provision in the lease or statute allowing teimina-
tion of tenancy such as our unlawful detainer statute, 
Title 38, Chapter 36. In this case we have both contmct 
and statutory provision. There is nothing mysterious 
about our rights for rescission in the event of illusory con-
sideration or material breach. We call the court's atten-
tion to Williston on Contracts, Sec. 104, 104al and 105a 
and particularly to the language contained in those sec-
tions as follows: 
"And in any case where a promise in terms or in ef-
fect provides that the promissor has a right to choose 
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one o:.., two alternatives, and by choosing one will es-
cape without suffering a detriment or giving the other 
party a benefit, the promise is insufficient co!IlSidera-
tion.'' 
See also, Amedcan Law Institute Restatement of the 
Law of Contrcts, Section 274 concerning failure of con-
sideration as a discharge of duty; Section 275 of the same 
citation which concerns rules for determining materiality 
of a failure to perform; and Section 277, failure of con-
sideration as a discharge of an e)cisting right or of action. 
The American Law Institulte Restatement of the Law of 
Contracts, Section 79 states as follows: 
"A promise or apparent promise which reserves by its 
terms to the promissor the privilege of alternative 
courses of conduct is insufficient consideraJtion if any 
of these courses of conduct would be insufficient con-
sideration if it alone were bargained for." In its il-
lustrations under Section 79, the restatement sets forth 
an example. 3. A offers to deliver B, at two dol-
lars a bushel, as many bushels of wheat not exceed-
ing 5,000 as B may choose to order within the next 
30 days. B accepts, agreeing to buy at that price as 
much as he shall order of A within the specified time. 
B's acceptance involves no promise by him and is not 
sufficient consideration.'' 
Compare that example with the situation here. Joneses 
have agreed to purchase from Thorvaldson sand, gravel 
and topsoil at the rate of 25c per yard and fill material at 
the rate of lc per yard, in such amounts as they may 
choose to order, but they may not choose to order any. 
Under such cireumstances, the Restatement says the con-
sideration is illusory and unenforceable. 
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The Appellant in their argument spend nwnerous pages 
attempting to distinguish between covenants and condi-
tions; however, we respectfully suggest that the distinc-
tion is not meritorious in this case for there are ample 
authorities that state under circumstances of this sort, the 
contract must fail. The concluding sentence that sum-
marizes the position of the Appellant is that contained on 
page 19 of their brief wherein they state "This is not a 
contract where it was wholly optional with the Joneses 
whether they should perform or not." Then they quote 
Williston on Sales, Volume II, Section 464. We are in har-
mony with that rule therein stated. We would like the 
Appellant to tell use wherein the contract performance 
was not wholly optional with Jones. What was there in 
the contract that Thorvaldson could compel Jones to do? 
The answer to this question will tell the Court whether 
the consideration was real or imaginary. We believe that 
the only answer to the question is that the consideration 
was imaginary, unless the Joneses were willing to have the 
contract construed as requiring them to take all of their 
material from the property leased from Thorvaldson. Since 
they say that that was not their intent and since the con-
tract itself is silent as to this subject and since their at-
torney, Mr. Elliason, drew that contract, we believe that 
it should be most strongly construed against the Jones' 
and the interpretation given to it necessarily means that 
there was no consideration. 
In the case of Washington Chocolate Co. vs. Canter-
bury Candy Makers, Inc., 138 Pac. 2d, 195, there was a 
contract drawn between the parties wherein the Canter-
bury Candy Makers agreed to purchase from the Washing-
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ton Chocolate Co. "all chocolate used by it at current price 
for chocolate at Seattle, Washington, and the same shall 
be paid for by the candy company in the ordinary course 
of business." The issue in that case was whether or not 
theTe was a lack of mutuality because of the indefiniteness 
of the contract. The court held that the consideration 
was illusory and unenforceruble and declared the contract 
null and void. 
It is a common rule of law in mineral development 
cas2s to require, by implication, that the Lessee utilize 
and deve1op the property to its fullest extent; otherwise, 
the consideration for the contract fails. Cases in support 
of this proposition are found in 76 ALR 2d commencing 
with page 710. 
In the case of Darr v. Eldridge, 66 New Mexico 260, 
346 Pac. 2d 1071, an action was brought to cancel a lease 
l>ei!Ween th-e Lessors and the Assignee of the Lessee. It 
appears that the premises were leased for the development 
qf a mineral water on the basis of a royalty of $100 per 
month for the first six months and thereafter a royalty 
on the basis of 5c per gallon for the first 4,000 gallons 
taken from the well each month. A dispute arose as to 
the amount of royalties to be paid for the mineral water 
used by the Lessees for the sale of vapor baths. After the 
litigation which was in favor of the Lessor, the Lessee 
abandoned the well and used city water supplemented 
with dry minerals. This practice was continued by the 
Assignee. The court held that under such circumstances 
the Lessee and his Assignee were bound by an implied 
covenant to use reasonable diligence in marketing the 
mineral water, and that for breach thereof, cancellation of 
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the lease was the appropriate remedy. The court stated 
that there were two propositions, to-wit: 1. "Lessors 
urge that the Lessee of the mineral well and his Assignee 
were bound by an implied covenant to use reasonable dili-
egnt'P in marketing the mineral wate. We agree." 2. 
"Assuming for the moment that the implied covenant was 
breached, the question arises whether cancelation will be 
decreed for such breach. The general rule in the cae of 
ordinary leases is that it will not unless the lease contains 
an express proviso to that effect. Shultz vs. Ramey, 64 
New Mexco 366, 328 Pac. 2d 937. However, the decisions 
holding that cancelation will be decreed for breach of an 
implied covenant in oil and gas leases preponderate. Three 
Summers Oil and Gas, 453-468 Perm. Ed. Merrill, Cov-
enants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases, page 362, (Second 
edition 1940) . And this is the rule that has been estab-
lshed in this jurisdiction. Libby vs. DeBuca, supra, has 
heretofore pointed out the lease in question should be gov-
erned by the principles applicable to oil and gas leases in-
cluding the doctrine that such a lease will be canceled for 
failure to exercise reasonable diligence in marketing the 
product. And such cancelation will be decreed against 
the assignee of the lease." 
In the case of Crystal George, et al vs. Ardith Jones, 
et al, 168 Nebraska 149, 95 Northwest 2d 609, 76 ALR 
2d 10, an action was brought against the surviving widow 
and administratrix and the heirs at law of the deceased 
Lessee, and the person to whom the administratrix had 
granted certain rights to remove gravel under the lease 
in question for forfeiture and ·cancelation of a mineral lease 
and to quiet title to all mineral rights in certain lands of 
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the plaintiffs. Under the lease granted to the Lessee for 
a five-year term, the Lessee agreed to pay as rental a stated 
sum for each cubic yard of gravel removed. The lease 
also provided that its terms were binding on the parties, 
their executocs, administrators, heirs and assigns. The 
plaintiff alleged that since the death of the Lessee the 
defendants had taken over and had assumed the lease but 
had failed to use any diligence in mining or extracting 
gravel and had failed to make reasonable effort to extract 
gravel, and although repeatedly warned, they had failed 
and refused to continue the efforts to mine and remove 
gravel from the premises. The defendants alleged affir-
matively that they had diligently sought to operate the 
lease since the Lessee's death and that they had difficulty 
in keeping the machinery in repair, which fact was known 
to the plaintiffs and that she had agreed that any delay 
because of such difficulty would nort place defendants in 
default. There was a sharp conflict in the evidence on 
the material issues. The court found that the lease had 
been forfeited that the plaintiffs were entitled to cancel-
ation. The Supreme Court of Nebraska concluded that 
forfeiture of the lease was proper for the Lessee breached 
the implied covenant which exists in mining leases and 
which the only consideration is the agreement by which 
the Lessee will pay a royalty on the product mined, that 
he will develop and operate the pit with reasonable dili-
gence. The court, in its decision., stated as follows: 
"We are cognizant that courts of equity a:bhor 
forfeitures, that they are odious in law and not fa-
vored by the courts and will nort be enforced unless 
the facts which purport to require such drastic ac-
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1ion come clearly and plainly within the provisions 
of the law or the lease as the case may be. See Don-
nelly vs. Soverign Camp WOW 111 Nebraska 499, 
197 Northwest 145. 
We deem the following authorities applicable to 
the factual situation in the instant case." 
The court then cited the cases· of Phillips vs. Ham-
ilton, 17 Wyoming 41, H5 Pac. 846, wherein it was held 
if the consideration of a lease is a royalty to be paid to 
the Lessor on the product of the mine, there is an im-
plied covenant that the work of the prospecting and de-
velopment shall be prosecuted wifu reasonable diligence. 
In Cotner vs. Mundy, 92 Oklahoma 268, 219 Pac. 321, 
it was held that where the only consideration for the 
lease of sand and gravel pit for a long period of years 
was a royalty on the sand and gravel removed and the 
lease contained no express provision for continuous op-
eration or for forfeiture for failure to develop and oper-
ate the pit, there was an implied covenant on the part of 
the Lessee to develop and operate the .pit with reasonable 
diligence. See also Freeport Sulphur Co. vs. American 
Sulphur Royalty Co., 117 Texas 439, 6 Southwest 2d 1039, 
60 ALR 890; Mansfield Gas Company vs. Alexander, 97 
Arkansas 167, 133 Southwest 873. 
Cases showing the requirement for diligent operation 
of percentage leases, even though not mineral, can be 
found in 170 ALR at 1107. These cases, although not 
cases involving sand, gravel, oil and other minerals, which 
cases seem to fall in a category by themselves, also say 
in the citations mentioned that failure to operate the bus-
iness leased so as to give maximum profit to the Lessor 
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can constitute a substantial breach for which forfeiture 
can be the remedy. The writer herein does not want to 
imply that all the cases in 170 ALR excated a f01rfeiture; 
hGwever, all of them decided in favor of the Lessor con-
cerning either forfeiture or damages. 
A ease that we believe is in oint in our particular 
situation is the case of Dickey vs. Philade~phia Minit-Man 
Corp., 105 A2d 580. In that case an action was brought 
to recove'l' possession of the property leased. The lease 
required the Lessee to pay a rental of 12lh% o[ the an-
nual groos sales and charges, but nort less than $1800.00 
yearly. 'Dhe agree'lnent also contained language that the 
property was ''to be used and occupied by Lessee in the 
business of washing and cleanng automobiles and * * * 
for no other purpose". The Lessee stopped washing au-
tomobHes, although it continued to simonize and polish 
automobHes. The Lessor brought an action on the basis 
of failure of consideration. The court held for the Les-
see; however, the important conside::ration in its decision 
was the fact that there was a minimum lease requirement 
of $1800.00 per year. The court cited a number of cases 
wherein forfeiture was the proper remedy and indicated 
that had the defendant "moved any part of his business 
to anorther location" or if the lease had nort had a mini-
mum rental provided, then the Court infocred that for-
feiture could have been the proper remedy. This we say 
is analogoru:s to our situation for here there was no mini-
mum rental or quantity to be taken by the Joneses and 
they, in fact, moved their business to orther premises. The 
proposition in the instant case is the very proposition 
which the court by dicta inferred it would declare a for-
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feiture in the Dickey case. The Respondent also cites 
the court to the dissenting opinion in the Dickey case 
wherein the minority would have worked a forfeiture re-
gardless. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
BREACHES OF CONTRACT ON THE PART OF THE 
JONESES WERE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR FOR-
FEITURE. 
The appellants contend that there is no evidence in 
the record that Joneses failed to remove overburden. We 
respectfully suggest that this is not the fact. In the sand 
and gravel business the manner and care in which over-
burden is removed is a material factor in the preserva-:-
tion and perfection of the quarry. If overburden is not 
removed in a proper manner it will become mixed with 
the sand and contaminated so as to reduce it in quality 
and grade, or in the alternative, such as ·in this case, 
the overburden at one time becomes such a problem to re-
move in relationship to the sand to be acquired that it 
becomes financially better to abandon the pit and start at 
some other location, even though thousands of tons of 
sand are wasted in the purocess. 
Evidence as to t!he careless and negligent excavation 
of sand at the expense of the owner of the property was 
elicited from Isiah Rex Allen, Bry·ant S. Jones, Grant E. 
Lloyd and Alvie Thorvaldson. Mr. Allen was called as a 
defendant's witness. Mr. Allen testified that he was fa-
miliar with this pit, that he was also acquainted with the 
Joneses and had done business with them when they were 
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in Delta (R. 135). He further stated that he had been in 
the concrete business himself (R. 135). Mr. Allen was ac-
quainted with the pr.roperty and had done work for the 
Joneses on the property in 1958 (R. 136). At that time 
he set up his crushing plant to make gravel for road ma-
terial and ready-mix and had occasion to see the condition 
of the pit (R. 137), which was shortly after the Joneses 
took possession. Mr. Allen drew a diagram o!f one of the 
pits and stated that all of the pits were in the same COill-
dition, to-wit: "It was a very big area and was rmoovered 
and the pits were in wonderful shape." (R. 139). H'e stated. 
in 1958, at the time the Joneses took over the pits he was 
able to move his sand and gravel down to his crusher by 
pushing it with a dozer ,and that the bulldorzer, under 1he 
circumstances the pits were in at that time, could feed 
the plant ( R. 139) . Thereafter, he testified as to the con-
dition of the pits as he saw them prior to trial while they 
were still in the possession of the Joneses. His answer 
was: 
"Q And what do the pits look like? 
A. I would hate to move in there now." * • • • (R. 
140). 
Q. (By Mr. Howard, continuing) What was the 
condition of the sand pit? 
A. I have been in the sand pit since that time since 
yesterday. I have acquired sand and gravel from the 
Joneses. 
Q. You mean at what time? 
A. Between the spring of '58 and two years ago. 
Q. Have you had occasion to observe their manage-
ment of the pits? 
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A. Yes. I couldn't help but see the difference in 
the way they managed the pit and the way Mr. Thor-
va.ldscm did. 
Q. And what is the difference? • • • • 
A. To my knowledge, they have never moved any 
overburden out. They have abandoned the one great big 
beautiful on account of the overburden slipping in. I'm 
speaking about the home place which is there by Mr. 
Thorvaldson's building. 
pit? 
Q. The home place is the big pit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What has prevented further operation of that 
A. Simply because the overburden wasn't removed. 
Q. Has the sand been taken out of the pit? 
A. No. Plenty of the pit would be in good shape 
if the overburden was removed." (R. 141). 
Mr. Allen went on in detail telling about how poorly 
the pits were managed and how much sluffing there was 
and how much sand would be lost because of contamina-
tion and what the time and cost of removing the oerbur-
den was (R. 142, 143). It is his estimate that it would 
take at least 10 days with a D-8 Caterpillar to remove 
the overburden from the big pit. Mr. Allen also testified 
that there was gravel in all of the pits and that there 
was sufficient gravel in the pits to run a sand and gravel 
operation. Specifically in respect to the large pit, he 
stated: 
"Q. Mr. Allen, if you were running the pit, is there 
sufficient gravel in the pit to provide for sand and gravel 
operation for concrete? 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
A. I would like to take it over and try it. 
Q. Do you think that there is? 
A. I certainly do. 
Q. Do you think the gravel could be screened out 
for gravel operation? 
A. I would want to do some work on the topsoil 
first. 
Q. Yoru mean the overburden? 
A. That's right. I don't say that that pit is in the 
position right now to go in there and set up a ready mix 
or gravel plant in there without some work ibeing done 
and go ahead and try to compete with Mr. Th01rvaldson 
or some other company but it could be done with a little 
management ·and work." 
Mr. Allen testified that no crusher would be needed 
and that all that would be required was just a grizzley to 
screen out the big rocks. And that the gravel coruld be 
screened out of the sand sufficient to run a ready mix 
business ( R. 149 150) . 
Mr. Thorvaldson testified in respect to the proiblem 
of the overburden, (R. 186). He testified concerning how 
dangerous and costly it would be to remove the overbur-
den under the circumstances (R. 186.). He testified con~ 
cerning the quantity of gravel available for removal when 
they took over the pit as compared to reduction of the 
Pit as it then stood at the time of trial (R. 187). Mr. 
':Dhorvaldson testified concerning what the Jones' oper~ 
ati<m has done to the sand and gravel in detail (R. 189). 
Mr. Grant E. Lloyd testified that the big pit was in 
bad shape at the time of the trial and that the overbur~ 
den was hanging over the edge, that they have excavated 
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the pit in such a manner as to prevent getting the over-
burden off of a portion of the sand and that the location 
of the o·v·erburden in respect to that sand has eliminated 
tl1e use of a few thousand yards of the sand and that if 
it Wl~n .. ~ not impossible to get the overburden off because 
of the danger to a caterpillar operator, that it would in 
any event be "awful expensive to get in there and try to 
gP! the overburden off of there." (R. 245, 246, 247). He 
said this condition prevailed on all the pits that the J oneses 
were operating and that the Joneses would merely oper-
ate a pit until no further sand or gravel could be taken 
out of it without effort and then move to another pit and 
Pxhaust it. All of the pits have been left in a poor condi-
tion (R. 247, 248). 
To say that no proof was elicited concerning the mis-
management of the pit and the status of the ovevburden 
is to ignore tens of pages. The court properly found that 
the overburden was poorly and inadequately removed 
and constituted a breach of the contractual provision 
which stated: "If the Lessees fail to operate the busi-
ness in a proper businesslike and workmanlike manner 
and/or fail because of business practices to keep up with 
the demand, the same will constitute grounds for for-
feiture of this lease." (Emphasis added.) The court will 
note the disjunctive use of "and/or." This language 
clearly shows that if the Lessees fail to operate the busi-
ness in a proper businesslike and workmanlike manner 
that forfeiture would be the proper remedy. The evi-
dence that has been submitted in respect to the failure to 
remove overburden in a workmanlike manner we believe, 
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contrr..ry to the statement of the Appellants, has been 
proven by oompetent evidence. 
Appellants make the same gross charge in respect to 
the court's finding that the Joneses failed to make sales 
slips fm~ material sold reasonably soon after sale and de-
livery of the material to customers and that they failed 
to account for sand and gravel stockpiled and removed 
from the premises. To say that there wasn't evidence 
in this respect is to ignore the fact. The Respondent called 
as a witness Mr. Leon Woodfield, a Certified Public Ac-
countant and Professor of Accounting at the Brigham 
Young Unive,rsity. Mr. Woodfield testified that he made 
an audit for a six-month period from January 1st through 
June 30th, 1962. Mr. Woodfield was the second accountant 
employed by Mr. Thorvaldson to make an audit. There 
had been one previous audit, which also found discrep-
ancies (R. 127. R. 190). Mr. Woodfield testified that on 
the basis of the books kept by the J oneses he was unable 
to determine whether all of the sales were recorded or 
not. His answer was: 
"Q. You couldn't tell whether all the sales were re-
corded? 
A. No, because of the state of the records, there 
was no way of determining if all sales had been recorded. 
There was nothing to tie them into other than the docu-
ment that was there. I have no way of knowing if a sale 
of gravel was sold but not recorded. 
Q. Did you have occasion to look at the accounting 
records to determine whether adequate Accounts Re-
ceivable or the cash receipts record were maintained so 
that you could cross-eheck them? 
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A. To my knowledge the Accounts Receivable is not 
complete and the sales of cash receipts is not in such a 
fashion for me to check that. I was mainly interested in 
the sales area, but in connection with this, in examining 
the sa!es documents and in discussion with the Jones 
people, I was unable to find these records." (R. 126). 
He stated that the J oneses took their personal living 
out of the till and made no accounting for the money that 
came in or left; and consequently, it was impossiJble to 
tally sales made with cash received or sales slips (R. 128). 
He also testified that the majority of the sales invoices 
were unsigned by the customer; and, consequently, there 
was no verification that the sales ticket conformed with 
the quantity delivered on the sales tickets that they did 
have (R. 128). He further testified ·that the invoices 
dw·ing the audit period were nort in numerical sequence. 
He stated that they jumped back and forth indicating 
that they were not made at the time of the sale (R. 129). 
His records disclosed that even by the sales slips kept 
by Mr. Jones that he had failed to account for 1,087.83 
yards of material sold for which he owed Thorvaldson a 
royalty (Exhibit No. 23). Mr. Jones himself testified 
that they did not make the sales slips out as the sales 
were made, that he relied upon memory in making sales 
slips or relied upon somebody telling him of the sale that 
was made (R. 171). 
Under the circumstances of these facts the court 
could do nothing more than conclude that the J oneses failed 
to maintain ordinary business records by which Thor-
valdson could make an audit to verify the royalties that 
were being paid. Even an audit, although of great ex-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
pense to Thorvaldson, would not establish the truth or 
falsity of the accounting tendered because of the defec-
tive record keep·ing of the Jones'. The whole basis for 
payrnent as established by the contract was upon quan-
tity sold, which necessarily implied that the lessee would 
maintain proper methods of accounting. This failure to 
keep records was a breach of the contract provisions re-
quiring the Lessees to keep books accessible to the Lessor 
for the purpose of computing the output of marketed sand, 
gravel and dirt at all times. It further breached the coo-
tract pro~ision requiring them to operate the business in 
a "businesslike" manner. 
The contract required, as determined by the amended 
decree, that "the defendants are ordered to pay a royalty 
of 25c per ·cubic yard for all topsoil, sand or gravel pro-
cessed on, or produced from, the premises leased by the 
plaintiffs to defendants and disposed of on the market." 
The accounting record shows that they did not pay a roy-
alty on at least 1,087 yards that weTe sold during the 
year ending June 30th, 1962, and based upon accounting 
extension, probably an equal amount for the years pre-
vious thereto. The record further discloses that the 
. J oneses had removed hundreds of yards of sand and oth-
er materials and stockpiled it on their own property, for 
which they paid no royalty. Mr. Lloyd testified that, in 
.his opinion, 1500 yards or so were stockpiled and unpaid 
for (R. 25·5). 
The record discloses that by Mr. Thorvaldson's own 
tally sheet of cement deliveries that he norted, the Jooeses 
purchased during the accounting period sufficient cement 
to make 2800 yards of concrete (R. 194). Since the ce-
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mt•nt added is offset by the weight (R. 163) all of the 
material that went into the concrete of 2800 yards should 
havP come from the Thorvaldson pit, although during 
the same period of time he was paid for 1140 yards (R. 
194). 
It is further shown by the record that the J oneses had 
no way of estimating accurately the amount of gravel 
and sand obtained from Thorvaldson as distinguished 
from the amount of gravel and sand taken from the Sum-
mit Creek Irrigation Company and/or Santaquin City. 
Their method of handling the sand and gravel was to 
dump them in separate piles and assume thart all of the 
material in the Thorvaldson pile was sand and that all 
of the material in the other pile was gravel, although ad-
mittedly, (R. 160) both piles contained sand and gravel 
for no screening was used. On the basis of the two stock-
piles they paid Mr. Thorvaldson for sand processed at the 
ratio of three quantities for every seven quantities used 
of the material obtained elsewhere. This is understand-
able, for the material that was being obtained elsewhere 
was costing them 7c a yard as distinguished from 25c 
that had to be paid Thorvaldson. Whether they used 
three-tenths of a yard of ~horvaldsons or four-tenths or 
nine-tenths is unknown, except by the estimate of Mr. 
Jones (R. 159, 160, 161). The only time that they make 
a record of the quantities sold that belong to Thorvald-
son is at the end of the quarter when they calculate how 
many yards of concrete they have sold and then deter-
mine that three-tenths of that quantity was sand and 
gravel taken from the Thorvaldson pit for which they 
owe Thorvaldson 25c per yard (R. 161). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
For the court to conclude that this method of ac-
counting was less than accurate and highly speculative, 
and certainly nort a record kept in a businesslike man-
ner, was justifiable. It is further obvious, and apparently 
the court believed, that by this method the Joneses had 
failed to account to Thorvaldson for sand and gravel re-
moved from his property and sold. 
It is interesting to note that the Joneses moved their 
sand and gravel operation from the premises of Thor-
valdson for the purpose of getting financial advantage. 
Mr. Jones has testified that he obtained sand and gravel 
from the Sumnrit Creek Irrigation Company for 7c a 
yard (R. 173) , and from Acord and Oldroyd for lOc a 
yard. The record containing his statement as to the 
amount that he paid Acord and Oldroyd is in the poc-
tion of the transcript not printed for the court, hOIWever, 
since the Appellant has not seen fit to print that portion 
of the transcript, it would seem authoritative to set forth 
the fact in this brief. By the interpretation placed on the 
agreement by Joneses, every yard of material that could 
be obtained from anyone orther than Thorvaldson saved 
the Joneses morey. This is the reason that they moved 
off the property so as to circumvent the court's decision 
wherein the decree required them to pay on material 
"processed" on the property. Their conduct in moving 
from the premises was not only a breach of contract, but 
an act of bad faith, for their contention at the prior trial 
was that the consideration was not illusory because they 
were required to get all of their material from Thorv·ald-
son. Their statements to the court in that instance ap-
parently were for expedience. 
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POINT III 
THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE 
JONESES OBTAINED SAND AND GRAVEL FROM 
OTHER THAN THE LEASED PREMISES, WHEN THE 
LEASED PREMISES COULD HAVE ADEQUATELY 
AND SATISFACfORILY SUPPLIED THEIR NEED. 
The evidence in respect to the overburden explains 
that the Joneses exhausted the pits without developing 
them. \Vhen the pits were exhausted for gravel purposes, 
they went to a source that was more economical and 
che-aper and claimed, therefore, that the Thorvaldson pits 
would not supply gravel. The assertion under Point III 
of the Appellant's brief is based upon the sole and self-
serving assertion of Mr. Bryant S. Jones. This testimony 
was in stark and diametric opposition to the testimony 
of Mr. Alvie 'Dhorvaldson, Mr. Grant E. Lloyd and Mr. 
Isiah Rex Allen. The transcript pages concerning their 
testimony in respect to gravel availaJble out of these pits 
has been set forth above. 
POINT IV 
THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN 
ADDITOR IN AN AMOUNT SUFFICIENT TO COM-
PENSATE THiEM FOR THE EXPENSE OF THEIR AT-
TORNEY ON APPEAL. 
We believe that the Supreme Court has authority 
Wlder Rule 76 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
direct the trial court to take additional testimony in re-
spect to time and effort spent by the attorneys for the 
Respondent on appeal and to modify the judgment ac-
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cordingly, or in the alternative that the Supreme Court, 
in the exercise of its sound discretion, may enter judg-
ment in accordance with corrected findings as it shall de-
termine. The Supreme Court has heretofore announced 
that there are inherent and implied powers to do just this 
and the Court exercised such powers in the case of Bodon 
vs. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 Pac. 2d 826. 
CONCLUSION 
Point 1 of the Appellant's brief raises no issue before 
this court foT the reason that it is an argument addressed 
to an alleged finding which the court did not in fact make. 
The court did not make a finding that there was no con-
.sideratinn or that the consd.deration was illusory. We have 
argued that po~nt because we believe that there was no 
consideration. Replying to Point 1 ga:ve us an oppor-
·tunity to point out a basic defect in the contract, however, 
even if this court found that there was consideration, it 
would not affect the judgment o[ the trial court, for its 
judgment was based upon breach o[ contract, and forfeit-
ure was exacted because that was the remedy pro~ded in 
the contract, and was the only satisfactory remedy at law. 
The Respondents respectfully urge that the decision 
of the trial court should not be lightly considered nor the 
findings set aside unless there are flagrant or obvioos de-
ects in them. We respectfully state that the findings of 
the trial court are supported by substantial and real evi-
dence and, the,refore, should not be disturbed on appeal. 
See O'Gara vs. Finlay, 6 Utah 2d 102, 306 Pac. 2d 1073. 
Lawrence vs. Bamberger Railroad Company, 3 Utah 2d 
247, 282 Pac. 2d 335; Gattavera vs. Scheuman, 51 Wash-
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ington 2d 55, 315 Pac. 2d 649; Winnegar vs. Slim Olsen, 
Inc., 122 Utah 47, 252 Pac. 2d 205. It is respectfully 
recommended that the judgment be affirmed and that an 
appropriate order be entered for the award of additional 
attorneys fees to the Respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON B. HOWARD, for 
HOWARD & LEWIS 
290 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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